Davis Lax and James Sebenius argue that creating value and claiming value are linked activities. Creating new value improves both parties' outcomes. However, having created new value, negotiators must still divide the resulting "pie." Unfortunately, the cooperative strategies needed to create value tend to undermine the competitive strategies used to claim value (and vice versa). The exaggeration and concealment needed for effective competition is directly opposed to the open sharing of information needed to find mutual benefits. On the other hand, taking an open cooperative approach makes one vulnerable to the hard bargaining tactics of a competitive negotiator. Therefore, if both parties cooperate, the result is usually good, while if one cooperates and the other competes, the competitor usually does better. However, if both compete, they usually come out worse than they would if both cooperated -- which is the same "payoff structure" as that of the prisoners' dilemma game. The assumption, however, is that claiming value in integrative (i.e., cooperative) situations is more likely to be balanced. This is because the parties are expected to develop cooperative relationships and communicate freely, which is not generally allowed in prisoners' dilemma games.
 The listed strategies were drawn from: David Lax and James K. Sebenius, The Manager as Negotiator: Bargaining for Cooperation and Competitive Gain. (New York: Free Press, 1986), 30-32.